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Abstract—Network Function Virtualization (NFV) enables flex-
ible implementation and provisioning of network functions as
virtual machines running on commodity servers. Due to the avail-
ability of multiple hosting servers, such network functions (also
called Virtual Network Functions (VNFs)) can be placed where
they are actually needed, dynamically migrated, duplicated, or
deleted according to the current network requirements. However,
the placement of VNFs within the physical network is one of the
main challenges in the NFV domain as it has a critical impact on
the performance of the network. In this work we focus on efficient
placement of Virtual Security Network Functions (VSNFs), i.e.
the placement of virtual network functions whose purpose is to
prevent or mitigate network security threats. In this regard, we
tackle the placement problem not only considering performance
optimization aspects, but also trying to find solutions that are
consistent from the security viewpoint. Specifically, the main
contribution of this paper is the formulation of the placement
problem by taking into account both Security and Quality of
Service (QoS) requirements of user applications.
I. INTRODUCTION
Network security implemented by Telecommunication Ser-
vice Providers (TSPs) has traditionally been based on the
deployment of specialized, closed, proprietary Hardware Ap-
pliances (HAs) for each security network function. Such
HAs are fixed in terms of functionality and placement in
the network, which means that even slight changes in the
security requirements generally necessitate manually intensive
and time-consuming re-configuration tasks, the replacement of
existing HAs or the deployment of additional HAs. This leads
to (i) limited protection of end-users from known security
threats, (ii) slow reaction to new security threats or variations
of known attacks, and (ii) high Operating Expenditure (OpEx)
and Capital Expenditure (CapEx) for TSPs.
The NFV [1] initiative has been proposed as a possible
solution to address the operational challenges and high costs
of managing proprietary HAs. The main idea behind NFV is
to transform network functions (e.g. firewalls, intrusion de-
tection systems etc.) based on proprietary HAs, into software
components (called VNFs) that can be deployed and executed
in virtual machines on commodity high-performance servers.
This approach decouples the software from the hardware, thus
it allows any (security) network function to be deployed in
any server connected to the network through an automated
and centralized management system.
The centralized management system, called NFV Manage-
ment and Orchestration (NFV MANO), controls the whole
life-cycle of each VNF. Specifically, the NFV MANO dynam-
ically creates, destroys, or migrates any VNF, depending on
specific network requirements or to balance the load across
different servers. Network Service Chaining (NSC) is a tech-
nique for selecting subsets of the network traffic and forcing
them to traverse various VNFs in sequence. For example, a
firewall followed by a Intrusion Prevention System (IPS), then
a Network Address Translation (NAT) service and so on. NSC
and NFV enable flexible, dynamic service chain modifications
to meet the real-time network demands.
In this paper, we investigate how to efficiently provision
application-specific security services by using NSC deploy-
ment techniques and by ensuring that the user’s application
requirements in terms of security and QoS are met. The main
contribution of this work is a mathematical formulation of
the placement problem where the objective function requires
minimization of the usage of network, computational and
memory resources subject to the following constraints:
• The placement must ensure that the Service Level Agree-
ment (SLA) between the TSP and the user is not violated
(namely, maximum end-to-end latency and minimum
bandwidth). Thus, the algorithm must place the VSNF
chains where links have enough residual capacity and
where nodes have enough residual computational and
memory resources to execute the functions of the chains.
• The placement must fulfill the security policies and best
practices as defined by the TSP. Namely, the order in
which the VSNFs are executed, the position of the VSNFs
in the network, and the operational mode of VSNFs
(either stateless or stateful).
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section
II provides the motivation behind this work. Section III details
the mathematical formulation of the placement problem. Sec-
tion IV presents the related work. Finally, the conclusions are
provided in Section V.
II. MOTIVATION
In NFV deployments, the placement of VNFs has a sig-
nificant impact on the performance of the network and on
the QoS level the operator can guarantee to users. Several
studies in the peer-reviewed literature tackle the problem by
proposing architectural and mathematical solutions with the
aim of optimizing the utilization of network and computational
resources and minimizing the operational costs [2], [3]. As
reported in Section IV, recent works go beyond the simple
cost and resource optimization by introducing more specific
constraints, either to enforce the security of the network [4],
[5], or to guarantee QoS parameters such as minimum band-
width and maximum end-to-end latency [6], [7].
We argue that the placement model for security VNFs
cannot neglect the SLA between operator and user, as the SLA
defines mandatory QoS policies required by the user. Omitting
Fig. 1. Motivating example.
the QoS requirements may lead, for instance, to a model that
blindly forces all the user traffic to traverse the whole chain of
VSNFs. As a result, computationally demanding VSNFs such
as Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) may cause a noticeable
performance degradation to latency-sensitive applications (e.g.
online games) or bandwidth sensitive applications (e.g. video
streaming). On the other hand, beyond the overall resource
consumption and QoS requirements, the model must also
take into account the specific security best practices and
policies. Omitting such aspects may result in the inappropriate
placement of a firewall in the middle of the network, thus
allowing unauthorized traffic to reach hosts that should be
protected. The approach presented in this paper is illustrated
by the sample scenario depicted in Fig. 1. In the example, a
TSP exploits the NFV technology to provide security services
tailored to specific users’ application requirements.
1. For instance, remote access to the user’s CCTV system
must be guaranteed only to the user and possibly to a secu-
rity agency. In this case, inspecting the video stream with an
IPS would not provide any additional protection but would
possibly reduce the frame rate of the video streaming, thus
compromising the detection of anomalous events. However,
control communication should be inspected.
2. Parental control is applied to Web traffic to block unwanted
media and social-media content, while an IDS might be
used to intercept malicious software (malware). Stateful
VSNFs track the state of network connections (e.g. Layer 4
firewall, NAT). In this case, the same VSNF instance must
be traversed by all traffic flows of a network conversation
(in Fig. 1, firewall on Web Client-Server interaction). More
flexible provisioning schemes can be adopted for stateless
VSNFs, where multiple instances of the same VSNF might
be deployed on different servers for load balancing.
3. An IDS might also be used to detect possible threats due to
the misuse of chatting tools integrated within the gaming
software (e.g., phishing [8], social engineering [9], etc.).
As the communication between the client and the server
relies on timely delivery of packets, IDS operations are not
executed on the in-game traffic. In this case the security is
enforced by a faster VSNF such as a Firewall, which checks
the packet headers without any deep-payload analysis. It
should be noted that web traffic and chat conversations
are often encrypted by TLS/SSL cryptographic protocols.
Although encryption preserves the confidentiality of the
traffic, it also prevents IDS-based VSNFs such as Parental
Control and IDS from inspecting the packets, thus allowing
an attacker to obfuscate malicious data in encrypted pay-
loads. However, the TSP could overcome this limitation
either using a Transparent Proxy VSNF or by exploiting
recent advances in network security [10].
4. As represented in the lowest section of Fig. 1, security best-
practices suggest that unwanted traffic should be blocked
as soon as it enters the network by placing firewalls and
IDS/IPS close to the border of the TSP domain. Another
generally accepted practice, is to place firewalls before
IDS/IPS (from the point of view of incoming traffic).
Firewalls are generally designed to drop non-legitimate
traffic very quickly, thus reducing the burden on IDS/IPS,
which are more computationally expensive. In this example,
unknown traffic is filtered, inspected and possibly classified
according to pre-defined categories by a Traffic Classi-
fier (TC) VSNF (e.g. online games, peer-to-peer, media
streaming, etc.) to dynamically provision further class-
specific VSNF chains. Penetration testing tools, such as
Port Scanner (PS) VSNFs, might also be used to pro-
actively find security breaches in the user’s configuration.
To summarize, the rationale behind our approach is the
following: (i) a user’s application should never under-perform
because of VSNF operations and (ii) the VSNF placement
must obey the operator’s security best-practices in terms of
application security requirements, position in the network,
operational mode (stateless or stateful VSNF), and order with
respect to the direction of the traffic. In Section III, we present
a mathematical model for the placement of VSNF chains based
on these criteria.
III. VSNF PLACEMENT MODEL
In this section, we provide a mathematical model to pro-
gressively embed security service requests, formed by one or
multiple VSNF chains, onto a physical network substrate by
considering the available resources and realistic constraints.
Physical network model. We represent the physical net-
work as an undirected and weighted graph G = (N,E), i.e.
a graph where the edges have no orientation and weights are
assigned to nodes and edges (see Fig. 2).
Fig. 2. Representation of the physical network as undirected weighted graph.
A node i ∈ N is characterized by the computational
resources γi ∈ N and memory resources µi ∈ N of a
server attached to the node, expressed in CPU and memory
units respectively (labels C and M in Fig. 2). Without loss of
generality and to simplify the model, µi indicates both volatile
memory and storage. Endpoints (EP) (e.g., a user’s computer
and a remote server) are characterized by γi = 0 and µi = 0
to prevent the algorithm from placing any VSNF on them.
A link (k, l) ∈ E is a wired connection between two nodes
k and l ∈ N . It is characterized by its capacity βk,l ∈ N+
and its propagation delay λk,l ∈ N+. Both are expressed as
positive integer numbers representing bandwidth and latency
units (labels B and L in Fig. 2).
Security service request. We model a security service
request as a set of independent weighted directed graphs:
Gs = {(U c, U cpairs) : c ∈ Cs}
where Cs is the set of unidirectional chains composing the
service request. Each graph includes nodes and arcs. Nodes
U c = Ac ∪ V c comprise user and remote applications (Ac,
the endpoints of chain c) as well as a subset of all VSNFs
(V c). Each arc in (U cpairs) delineates the order of traversing
the VSNFs ∈ V c between endpoints in Ac.
A security service request is represented in Fig. 3. The
request in the example comprises three chains, each one
identified by the type of traffic and its direction. A security
service request is fulfilled if and only if all the chains in the
request can be mapped onto the physical network.
Fig. 3. Example of security service request for the CCTV application.
A node u ∈ U c is characterized by its requirements in terms
of computational units γcu and memory units µ
c
u for processing
the traffic flows in chain c ∈ Cs (C and M in Fig. 3). Endpoints
are characterized by γcu = 0 and µ
c
u = 0 to allow the algorithm
to place them on the physical substrate’s endpoints. A VSNF
u ∈ V c is also characterized by the latency λci,u it introduces
in the dataplane to process a packet when running on node
i. The latency is a function of γi and γcu. Each chain c ∈
Cs is characterized by its requirements in terms of minimum
bandwidth βc and maximum latency λc (B and L in Fig. 3).
A. Integer Linear Programming (ILP) formulation
Definitions. Let us first define two binary variables:
• xci,u indicates whether node u ∈ U c is mapped to i ∈ N .
• yck,l,i,j,u,v indicates whether physical link (k, l) ∈ E
belongs to the path between nodes i and j to which
u, v ∈ U c are mapped.
The residual capacity of a link, β′k,l, is defined as the total
amount of bandwidth available on link (k, l) ∈ E:
β′k,l = βk,l −
∑
c∈C, i,j∈N
(u,v)∈Ucpairs
βc · yck,l,i,j,u,v
thus, the nominal capacity of link (k,l) minus the bandwidth
required by the chains c ∈ C already mapped on that link.
The residual capacity of a node, is defined as its nominal
CPU and memory capacities minus the CPU and memory
resources used by the VSNFs v instantiated on the node:
γ′i = γi −
∑
{c∈C,u∈V c} γ
c
u · xci,u
µ′i = µi −
∑
{c∈C,u∈V c} µ
c
u · xci,u
Problem formulation. Given a physical network G, for
each security service request Gs find a suitable mapping of
all its unidirectional chains on the physical network, which
minimizes the physical resources of G spent to map Gs, also
known as the embedding cost.
Hence, the solution of the problem is represented by a set of
xci,u and y
c
k,l,i,j,u,v such that the cumulative usage of physical
resources for all the virtual networks is minimized:∑
c∈Cs, i,j∈N,
(k,l)∈E,(u,v)∈Ucpairs
bk,l · βc · yck,l,i,j,u,v +
∑
c∈Cs,i∈N,u∈V c
(ci · γcu +mi · µcu) · xci,u
Where bk,l, ci and mi are the costs for allocating bandwidth,
CPU and memory. They penalize the resources with less
residual capacity to minimize fragmentation:
bk,l =
1
β′k,l + δ
ci =
1
γ′i + δ
mi =
1
µ′i + δ
where δ −→ 0 is a small positive constant used to avoid
dividing by zero in computing the value of the function.
B. Constraints
Routing constraint (1) ensures that each node u ∈ U c is
mapped to exactly one physical node i ∈ N . Constraint (2)
instructs the algorithm to verify that the definition of yck,l,i,j,u,v
is applied based on the chains in the service request. Constraint
(3) ensures the path created for pair (u, v) starts at exactly one
edge going out from node i to where VSNF (or start/endpoint)
u is mapped. Similarly, (4) ensures the correctness and the
uniqueness of the last edges in the path. Constraints (2-4)
can be easily linearized. Constraint (5) is the classical flow
conservation constraint. That is, an outbound flow equals an
inbound flow for each intermediate node l (intermediate nodes
cannot consume the flow).∑
{i∈N} x
c
i,u = 1 ∀c ∈ Cs,∀u ∈ U c (1)
yck,l,i,j,u,v ≤ xci,u · xcj,v
∀c ∈ Cs,∀i, j ∈ N, ∀(u, v) ∈ U cpairs,∀(k, l) ∈ E
(2)
∑
{(i,k)∈E,j∈N} y
c
i,k,i,j,u,v · xci,u · xcj,v = 1
∀c ∈ Cs,∀i ∈ N, ∀(u, v) ∈ U cpairs
(3)
∑
{(k,j)∈E,i∈N} y
c
k,j,i,j,u,v · xci,u · xcj,v = 1
∀c ∈ Cs,∀j ∈ N, ∀(u, v) ∈ U cpairs
(4)
∑
k∈N
(k,l)∈E
yck,l,i,j,u,v =
∑
m∈N
(l,m)∈E
ycl,m,i,j,u,v (5)
∀c ∈ Cs,∀i, j ∈ N, ∀l ∈ N, l 6= i, l 6= j,∀(u, v) ∈ U cpairs
Resource constraints (6-8) ensure that the resources con-
sumed by a security service do not exceed the available
bandwidth, computational and memory capacities.∑
c∈Cs, i,j∈N
(u,v)∈Ucpairs
yck,l,i,j,u,v · βc ≤ β′k,l ∀(k, l) ∈ E
(6)
∑
{c∈Cs,u∈V c} x
c
i,u · γcv ≤ γ′i ∀i ∈ N (7)∑
{c∈Cs,u∈V c} x
c
i,u · µcv ≤ µ′i ∀i ∈ N (8)
QoS constraint (9) verifies that the requirements in terms of
maximum end-to-end latency are met. It takes into considera-
tion the propagation delay of physical links and the processing
delay of VSNFs. Note that the minimum bandwidth require-
ment is verified against the bandwidth resource constraint (6).∑
i∈N,u∈V c
xci,u · λci,u +
∑
i,j∈N,(k,l)∈E
(u,v)∈Ucpairs
yck,l,i,j,u,v · λk,l ≤ λc ∀c ∈ Cs (9)
Security constraints ensure that the TSP’s security policies
are applied. Specifically, constraint (10) forces a subset of the
chains in the request to share the same VSNF instance in
case of stateful flow processing. Constraint (11) forces the
algorithm to place the VSNF or start/endpoint u ∈ U c in a
specific region of the network defined as a subset Mu ⊂ N .
xc1u,i = x
c2
u,i ∀c1, c2 ∈ Ds ⊂ Cs, i ∈ N, u ∈ V c (10)∑
{i∈Mu} x
c
i,u = 1 Mu ⊂ N, |Mu| ≥ 1, u ∈ V c (11)
In particular, constraint (11) can be used to place a specific
VSNF close to the user or on the border of the TSP network.
Similarly, the veto constraint (12) can be used to prevent
the placement of any VSNFs on a pre-defined subset of
nodes M ⊂ N . A TSP may choose to do this to protect
specific nodes that host sensitive data or critical functions from
potentially malicious user traffic.∑
{i∈M,u∈V c} x
c
i,u = 0 ∀c ∈ Cs,M ⊂ N, |M | ≥ 1 (12)
Finally, for each chain c ∈ Cs, the correct order of VSNFs
in V c is ensured by constraints (1-5), plus constraint (11)
applied to the endpoints of the chain in Ac (user and remote
applications) with |Mu| = 1.
IV. RELATED WORK
In the context of network security, only a few solutions
have been proposed for the problem of the optimal placement
of VSNFs. In [4], the authors propose a model for the place-
ment of VSNFs by taking into account security deployment
constraints. Such constraints are necessary to avoid incorrect
deployment of security functions such as placing an IDS on
an encrypted channel. The authors propose an ILP formulation
of the problem and validate their model by measuring the
execution time in four different scenarios and by comparing
the model with other heuristics in terms of placement cost.
However, the proposed optimization algorithm is always com-
puted for all flows in the network, therefore it does not scale
well. The authors mitigate the problem by partitioning the net-
work into independent blocks. Nevertheless, the partitioning
scheme is limited to fat-tree topologies. Furthermore, the end-
to-end latency is not considered among the constraints of the
proposed model, which limits its application space.
In [5], the authors provide a model to determine the best
placement of security VNFs based on the user requirements
and the cost for the network operator. However, the proposed
approach does not take into account the specific QoS require-
ments of the user’s applications. This may lead to inefficient
deployments where resources are over-provisioned to cover
as many application classes as possible. Of greater concern,
the proposed model could unnecessarily apply computationally
demanding VSNFs (e.g., IDS, Deep Packet Inspection (DPI))
to latency-sensitive traffic (e.g., online gaming), resulting in a
significant drop in the user’s quality of experience.
The method proposed in [11] is based on light-weight,
protocol-specific intrusion detection VNFs. The system dy-
namically invokes a chain of these IDSs according to the traffic
characteristics. The placement of the chains is based on a user-
defined or common shortest-path algorithm such as Dijkstra,
without consideration of the application QoS requirements or
available network/computational resources.
In [12], the authors argue that reactive mechanisms used by
cloud providers to deploy VSNFs do not ensure an optimal
resource allocation. In this regard, the authors propose a novel
resource allocation scheme, which estimates the behavior of
the traffic load by monitoring the history of the current VSNFs,
and pro-actively provisions new instances of those VSNFs
as a countermeasure to any incoming resource pressure. The
proposed algorithm does not tackle the problem of VSNF
chaining. Instead, it focuses on the optimal placement of new
instances of VSNFs, which are part of existing chains. More-
over, it assumes infinite network and computational resources.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this position paper, we have tackled the problem of the
optimal placement of security VNFs by taking into account
security and QoS requirements of user applications. We have
also discussed the rationale behind our design decisions and
presented an ILP formulation of the placement problem.
As future work, we will develop a heuristic-based approx-
imation solution of the problem and we will validate it on a
NFV-enabled network. In this context, we will also investigate
the performance of the proposed algorithm when reconfiguring
the provisioned security services, for instance, to support
mobile users or for optimization purposes.
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